Prisoners Have No Right to Procedural Due Process in Interinstitution Transfers: \u3ci\u3eMeachumn v. Fano\u3c/i\u3e, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) by Sindelar, Tim
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 3 Article 11
1977
Prisoners Have No Right to Procedural Due
Process in Interinstitution Transfers: Meachumn v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)
Tim Sindelar
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Tim Sindelar, Prisoners Have No Right to Procedural Due Process in Interinstitution Transfers: Meachumn v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), 56
Neb. L. Rev. 753 (1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol56/iss3/11
Note
Prisoners Have No Right
To Procedural Due Process
In Interinstitution Transfers
Meachumn v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade marked an evolution in the development and
definition of rights retained by individuals after conviction and
incarceration. In a cautious, step-by-step approach, a number of
Supreme Court cases rejected the traditional "hands-off" attitude
toward conflicts between prisoners and prison administrators.'
These decisions delineated specific constitutional rights that
were not to be limited by the mere fact of incarceration. The
general precept of these decisions was that incarceration should not
deprive one of constitutionally protected rights, when the exercise
of such rights could be reconciled with confinement.2
A corresponding line of cases was dedicated to protecting
individuals from arbitrary governmental interference or depriva-
tion. These decisions delineated which interests were to be pro-
tected by the requirements of procedural due process, and what
procedures were required before particular deprivations could be
made.3
These two emerging trends intersected in Morrissey v. Brewer4
and Wolff v. McDonnell.5 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held
1. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Preiser v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1319 (1972); John-
son v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
See also Sastre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. Millemann & Milleman, The Prisoner's Right to Stay Where he is:
State and Federal Transfer Compacts Run Afoul of Constitutional Due
Process, 3 CAP. U.L. Rav. 223 (1974).
3. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
5. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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that certain minimal procedural safeguards protected a parolee's
interest in his limited liberty.6 Wolff was of even farther reaching
consequence. There, Nebraska prisoners had been deprived of
statutory "good time" and placed in solitary confinement without
adequate notice of the charges against them or a chance to refute
those charges. It was held that due process required that certain
protections, tailored to the prison environment, be given before
such deprivation.7
Many courts and observers saw Wolff as a call to examine arbi-
trary prison practices which denied inmates basic rights and priv-
ileges.8 One logical extension was to the area of interinstitution
transfers. Morrissey had stated that whether any procedural pro-
tections were due depended on the extent to which an individual
would be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."9  Wolff indicated
that due process was required when there was a "major change in
the conditions of confinement."' 0 Many lower court decisions held
that when a transfer from a minimum security institution to a
maximum security institution involved a grievous loss, notice and
hearing had to be afforded." This issue was presented to the Su-
6. Specifically, the parolee was entitled to a preliminary probable cause
hearing at or reasonably near the place of the alleged violation or
arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest and a revocation
hearing with a wider panoply of due process requirements. 408 U.S.
at 485, 489.
7. A prisoner is entitled to: (a) advance notice of the charges; (b) a
written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for disciplinary action; (c) the right to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in his behalf. 418 U.S. at 563, 566.
8. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Meyers
v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp.
818 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 600 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
9. 408 U.S. at 481.
10. 418 U.S. at 571-72 n.19.
11. See Lokey v. Richardson, 527 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975); Carlo v.
Gunter, 520 F.2d 1293 (1st Cir. 1975) (transfer to a more severe wing
of the same institution); Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973); Gray v. Cream-
er, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652 (D.
Mass. 1975); Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974)
(transfers between federal institutions); Clonce v. Richardson, 379
F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (transfer into special behavior mod-
ification program); Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Croom v.
Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586 (D. Conn. 1973) (transfer from state to fed-
eral institution); Newkirk v. Butler, 364 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
modified, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd as moot sub nom. Preiser
v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238
(D.N.H. 1973); White v. Gillman, 360 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Iowa 1973);
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preme Court in Meachum v. Fano.12
II. THE FACTS
In 1974, there were ten weeks of serious unrest at the Massa-
chusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, a medium security
institution. Using information obtained from informants, prison
authorities identified six inmates who engaged in "criminal con-
duct" possibly related to the unrest. These inmates were removed
from the general prison population and placed in an area usually
used for processing new inmates.' 3
The Norfolk prison classification board then initiated proceed-
ings to determine whether the six prisoners should be transferred to
another institution. Each was notified of the classification hearing
and of the allegations against him. Individual hearings followed,
at which the prisoners appeared, were allowed to present evidence
in their own behalf and were represented by individual counsel.
The classification board also relied on testimony given in camera
by Meachum, the Norfolk prison superintendent, concerning re-
ports from informants.14 The six inmates, however, were not told
the details of the informants' reports.' 5
The classification board recommended that inmate Royce be
placed in administrative segregation for thirty days, that inmates
Fano, Dussault, and MacPherson be transferred to Walpole, and
that inmates Debrosky and Hathaway be transferred to Bridgewa-
ter. Walpole is a maximum security institution where the living
Park v. Thompson, 356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Hawaii 1973); Capitan v. Cupp,
356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1972); 'Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339
(D. Vt. 1972); Gomes v. Travisono, 353 F. Supp. 457 (D.R.I. 1973);
United States v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also
Broude, The Use of Involuntary Interprison Transfer as A Sanction,
3 Am. J. Clim. L. 117 (1974); Millemann & Millemann, The Prisoners
Right to Stay Where he is: State and Federal Transfer Compacts Run
Afoul of Constitutional Due Process, 3 CAP. U.L. REv. 223 (1974); Note,
Procedural Due Process in the Involuntarj Institutional Transfer of
Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REV. 333 (1974); Note, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 134
(1973). But see United States v. Henderson, 526 F.2d 889 (5th Cir.
1976); Bloeth v. Montayne, 514 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1975) (distinguish-
ing between protective and punitive transfers); Fajeriak v. McGinnis,
493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974); Hillen v. Director of Dep't of Social
Serv. & Hous., 455 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971).
12. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
13. Id. at 216.
14. Id. at 216-18.
15. Id. at 218.
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conditions are substantially less favorable than those at Norfolk,
while Bridgewater has both maximum and medium security facili-
ties.
The Acting Deputy Commissioner for Classification and Treat-
ment and the Commissioner of Corrections reviewed the classifica-
tion board's recommendations and written report. They approved
the recommendation that Fano, Dussault, and MacPherson be
transferred to Walpole and, in addition, ordered that DeBrosky and
Royce be transferred there. Hathaway's transfer to Bridgewater
also was approved. These transfers were carried out as to Fano,
Dussault, MacPherson, and Royce. 6
During this procedure, the inmates initiated an action under 42
U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that the petitioners, Meachum, Hall,
the State Commissioner of Corrections, and Dawbar, the Acting
Deputy Commissioner for Classification and Treatment, had de-
prived them of liberty without due process of law in that the
transfers had not been accompanied by a full fact-finding hearing.
They sought an injunction setting aside the ordered transfer, with
declaratory relief.1 7
The district court, relying on Wolff v. McDonnell, ordered that
the inmates be returned to the general prison population, because it
found the notice and hearing to be constitutionally inadequate.'8
A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. 19
III. THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's inquiry focused on whether the transfer
from the medium-security institution at Norfolk to the maximum-
security institutions of Walpole and Bridgewater infringed upon
any "liberty interest" within the protection of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court rejected the notion that every grievous loss requires
the procedural protections of the due process clause.2 0 This rejec-
tion was grounded on Board of Regents v. Roth,2 ' wherein the
Court held that due process did not apply to the dismissal of a
nontenured university professor.
16. Id. at 218-21.
17. Id. at 222.
18. Id.
19. 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975).
20. 427 U.S. at 224.
21. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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The claim that any change in the conditions of confinement
that has a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner must be
prefaced or accompanied by the procedural guarantees of due
process also was dismissed. The opinion reasoned that a prisoner,
once validly convicted, has been deprived of his liberty to a signifi-
cant extent. This deprivation of liberty subjects a prisoner to the
rules of a state's prison system, subject only to certain constitution-
al limitations. These constitutional limitations do not require that
due process be followed when the initial assignment to a particular
prison is made, or that a state maintain different prisons for
different classifications of individuals. 22
Proceeding from this base, the Court held that a decision to
transfer among various institutions was "within the normal limits
or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State
to impose," 23 despite the fact that the prisoner might be transferred
to an institution where life is much more disagreeable.
Although Wolff v. McDonnell established that prisoners retain
important rights, the Court was unwilling to interfere with the
discretion of prison officials in ordering transfers. Wolff was
distinguished because its roots were in state law. The Court
emphasized that the liberty interest involved there was the statutory
right to "good time," created by state law, not a right originating in
the Constitution.2
In contrast, Massachusetts law does not protect the right of a
prisoner to remain where he is. In fact, Massachusetts law appears
to authorize discretionary transfers by prison authorities.25 Thus,
the Court found Wolff to be inapplicable. 26
The Court also dismissed a claim that transfers are often
linked, as in this case, to charges of serious behavior and thus
require a hearing process. It was noted that transfers may occur
for any of a number of reasons, and that a prisoner has no interest
that must be protected in the transfer situation, regardless of the
reason.
27
In a brief footnote, the Court dealt with the effect of a transfer
on the possibilities of parole.28  It simply stated that "the grant-
22. 427 U.S. at 224.
23. Id. at 225.
24. Id. at 225-26.
25. See MASS. Gz. LAw. ANN. ch. 127, § 97 (West Supp. 1974).
26. 427 U.S. at 227.
27. Id. at 228.
28. Id. at 229 n.8.
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ing of parole has itself not yet been deemed a function to which
due process requirements are applicable."2 9
In conclusion, the Court commented on the propriety of federal
judges' interference in the daily functioning of state prisons.30
Ironically, in support of this language which reflected the tradition-
al hands-off approach to prisoners' rights, the Court cited Preiser v.
Rodrigier,31 Cruz v. Beto,3 2 and Johnson v. Avery. 33  These cases
were instrumental in establishing that certain rights are retained by
prisoners.
IV. THE DISSENT
Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Marshall, wrote a strong dissent.3 4  Stevens criticized the
majority's analysis of the origins of a "liberty interest," rejecting its
holding that such an interest must either originate in the Constitu-
tion or have its roots in state law. Instead of liberty flowing from
the law, he reasoned, law is a limitation on liberty imposed by the
sovereign. Liberty is a cardinal inalienable right which the due
process clause protects.3 5
Moreover, the prisoner does not surrender all of his "liberty"
interest upon conviction. Stevens noted that the view that an
inmate is a mere slave has been rejected.36
His dissent relied heavily on Morrissey v. Brewer,37 and on his
own analysis of Morrissey for the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Twomey.38 There, Stevens had reasoned that Morrissey estab-
lished that due process should accompany any substantial depriva-
tion of the liberty of a person in custody.3 9 To limit the holding of
Morrissey to a parolee's interest in his limited freedom would
demean Morrissey, and the very concept of liberty.40
Justice Stevens recognized the state's interest in the preserva-
tion of order and discipline in its institutions, but also noted that an
29. Id.
30. Id. at 228-29.
31. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
32. 405 U.S. 3.19 (1972).
33. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
34. 427 U.S. at 229.
35. Id. at 230.
36. Id. But see Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Grat.) 790, 796 (1871).
37. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
38. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 712-13.
40. 427 U.S. at 233.
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inmate has a right to maintain his dignity and to pursue his limited
rehabilitative goals.4 1 For the prisoner's interests be protected, it
is important that the state interests be achieved in a nonarbitrary
manner-that is, certain procedural requirements of due process
must be met.
Stevens noted that the due process clause should be activated
only when a transfer occasions a "grievous loss,"42 and that the
requirements of due process are flexible and adaptable to various
situations. However, he added that an interinstitution transfer
may require procedure similar to that used when a prisoner is
moved to solitary confinement.43
V. ANALYSIS
The opinion of the majority is disconcerting in many respects.
Not only is the holding a step backward away from freeing prison-
ers of the arbitrary decisions of prison officials, but the analysis has
frightening implications.
The decision in Meachum conflicts with the stance of a great
majority of lower federal and state courts. 44 These courts carefully
considered the prisoner's interest in remaining in his present place
of confinement. The injuries suffered by transferred inmates have
been catalogued by the lower courts as including separation from
family and friends,45 difficulty in access to counsel and the
courts,46 drastic changes in the conditions of confinement, 47 inter-
ruption of rehabilitative programs, 48 injury to parole opportuni-
ties, 49 revocation of "good time,"50 problems in integration into the
prison community,51 loss of educational opportunities,5 2 and expo-
sure to a more hardened inmate population.5 3 The lower courts
held that because transfer could involve these injuries, it often
constituted a grievous loss.5 4 Such a grievous loss, according to a
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id. at 234-35.
43. Id. at 235.
44. See note 11 supra.
45. See Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974).
46. See id.; Croom v. Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586 (D. Conn. 1973).
47. See Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974); Walker v.
Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Croom v. Manson, 367
F. Supp. 586 (D. Conn. 1973).
48. See cases cited in note 46 supra.
49. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
50. Broude, supra note 11.
51. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
52. See cases cited note 45 supra.
53. Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
54. See generally cases cited in note 11 supra.
760 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL 56, NO. 3 (1977)
Morrissey-based analysis, must be accompanied by the procedural
requirements of due process.
Prior to Meachum, the Ninth Circuit was alone in its determi-
nation that transfers need not be accompanied by due process.55
However, by 1975, the Ninth Circuit appeared to be heading in the
direction of the other circuits which had considered the question.56
The Supreme Court, thus, rejected the well-reasoned and artic-
ulate decisions of many federal courts. In doing so, it employed
an analysis that appears to be based on an incorrect view of the
interrelationship of law and liberty.
As Justice Stevens emphatically noted in his dissent in Mea-
chum, the Court's decision was based on the contention that liberty
is defined by either the Constitution or state law.57 Such an
approach is antithetical to the political philosophy employed by this
nation in its development. John Locke, one of the guiding spirits
of the American Revolution saw all men as naturally in a state of
liberty, "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and
dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depend-
ing upon the will of any other man."58 This natural liberty is not
"to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have
only the law of Nature for his rule."5 9 The authors of the Federal-
ist Papers saw no need for an enumerated Bill of Rights, for as the
people "retain every thing, they have no need of particular reserva-
tions."60 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, liberty exists in
and of itself, apart from the rule of law. Law serves to impose
restrictions on the government's interference with liberty.6
The decision in Meachum also was at odds with the principles
set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer.62 Morrissey held that "[w]heth-
er any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to
55. Hillen v. Director of Dep't of Social Serv. & Hous., 455 F.2d 510 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Duncan v. Madigan, 278
F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960).
56. See Lokey v. Richardson, 527 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975) (due process
is required where a nonconsensual transfer results in conditions of
confinement substantially worse than those prior to transfer).
57. 427 U.S. at 230.
58. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent & End of
Civil Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT 1, 4 (1948).
59. Id.
60. A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, in THE FEDERALIST 575, 578 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
61. 427 U.S. at 230.
62. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss."' 63
Many of the lower court decisions dealing with prison transfers
relied on the Morrissey analysis of "grievous loss' 64 The majori-
ty's decision failed to consider this analysis, and did not even
mention Morrissey.
Morrissey's emphasis on "grievous loss" was based on Gold-
berg v. Kelly,65 and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.66 In Goldberg,
the Court held that a welfare recipient could not have his or her
welfare payments terminated without at least minimal procedural
protection. Meachum appears to reject the logic of Goldberg.
Meachurm also implicitly rejected some of the holding in Wolff
v. McDonnell.6 7  Although the major concern in Wolff was the
loss of good time, which, as the Meachum majority emphasized,
was based in state law, it also was concerned with the imposition of
solitary confinement. In a footnote, Wolff stated that solitary
confinement
represents a major change in the conditions of confinement and is
normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there
has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good
time, there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge
against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for im-
position of the sanction.6 8
Justice Marshall, in a partially concurring partially dissenting opin-
ion joined by Justice Brennan, viewed this statement as vitally
important to the logic of Wolff. Justice Marshall wrote:
The Court defines the liberty interest at stake here in terms of the
forfeiture of good time as a disciplinary measure. Since it is only
loss of good time that is at issue in this case, this definition is of
course quite appropriate here. But lest anyone be deceived by the
narrowness of this definition, I think it important to note that this
is obviously not the only liberty interest involved in prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings which is protected by due process. Indeed,
the Court later observes that due process requires the same pro-
cedural protection when solitary confinement is at issue .... The
Court apparently holds that inmates' "liberty" is protected by due
process whenever "a major change in the conditions of confine-
ment" is imposed as a punishment for misconduct. I agree.6 9
63. Id. at 481.
64. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
65. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
67. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
68. Id. at 571-72 n.19.
69. Id. at 581 n.1.
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The focus on "a major change in the conditions of confinement" is
merely Morrissey's "grievous loss" test, refined for the penal envi-
ronment. The lower courts utilized the "major change" rationale
in holding that prison transfers required due process.7 0  Meachum
rejected the rationale of Goldberg, Morrissey, and Wolff.
Meachum may signal a return to the right-privilege dichotomy
that characterized earlier due process analysis. Its emphasis on the
role of state law and the Constitution in defining the "liberty
interest" was remarkably similar to decisions such as Adler v.
Board of Education,71 and United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.)
v. Mitchell,7 2 which held that due process was not required when
government action deprived a person of a privilege.73 The right-
privilege dichotomy has been explicitly rejected,74 yet Meachum
appears to mark a return to that logic.
Meachum also emphasized the ancient priority of property
rights. By rejecting the expansive "liberty interest" definition of
Morrissey, the Court, in effect, held that it is principally property
interests that are protected from arbitrary government deprivation.
This analysis is particularly disconcerting when considered in
the context of the prison environment. As Justice Douglas has
stated: "Every prisoner's liberty is, of course, circumscribed by
the very fact of his confinement, but his interest in the limited
liberty left to him is then only the more substantial."7 5 The Court
in Meachum failed to recognize that although the ordinary individ-
ual enjoys many rights that are protected, the prisoner has a very
real and substantial interest in the limited pleasures and expecta-
tions that confinement allows him. Furthermore, the state has an
interest in insuring that prisoners are not subject to arbitrary
decisions.7 6  Rehabilitation, may be impaired if the prisoner is
deprived of any voice in decisions which affect him.77
The Court's decision also failed to reflect on the use of trans-
fers as punishment. The American Correctional Association Man-
ual of Corrections noted that "[i]n any penal system embracing
several institutions, transfer from one to another is often an effec-
70. See note 1.1 supra.
71. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
72. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
73. 342 U.S. at 492.
74. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). "It is hardly use-
ful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether
the parolee's liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.'" Id. at 482.
75. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 594 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
76. See 427 U.S. at 234 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Comes v. Traviseno, 353 F. Supp. 457, 468 (D.R.I. 1973). See also
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tive disciplinary procedure."7 8 Meachum approved the use of
transfers to punish prisoners without due process. Prison authori-
ties now may proceed to transfer inmates whom they suspect of
misconduct, but against whom there is insufficient evidence to
meet the due process requirements of Wolff.
Finally, some statements in Meachum appear to mark a return
to the traditional hands-off approach regarding the protection of
prisoners' rights.79 The Court expressed its concern that a con-
trary decision "would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of
discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of
prison administrators rather than of the federal courts."8 0 This
holding, coupled with the recent decision in Baxter v. Palm-
igiano,8s which left certain procedural matters in disciplinary
hearings to the "sound discretion of prison authorities,"8 2 may
herald a return to a noninterventionist role by the federal courts in
prisoners' rights cases. Such a return would mark an end to an era
of decisions that reflected a serious concern for the rights and
dignity of inmates.8 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Meachum v. Fano severely limited the "liberty interest" of
prisoners. Deciding that prisoners facing interinstitution transfers
have no interest protected by the due process clause of the four-
PRSmENT'S CoMMISSION oN LAw ENFORCEmENT AND ADmISTRATION
OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 82 (1967).
78. AmIERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS 416 (1966).
79. For a discussion of the "hands-off' doctrine and the cases formulating
that doctrine, see Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Griev-
ances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 175 (1970); Comment, Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508 n.12 (1963).
80. 427 U.S. at 225.
81. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
82. Id. at 322.
83. The future may not be totally dim. In Holmes v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1976) the Seventh Circuit held that
the classification as a "special offender" required due process. The
court distinguished the holding in Meachum as follows:
No such cognizable benefit was bestowed upon prisoners in
Meachum or Montayne and we do not read those cases to
eliminate due process where cognizable benefits have been
established by prison policy itself and eligibility for the
benefits is precluded or significantly reduced by the occur-
rence of a specified event ....
Id. at 1252-53. If other courts adopt this narrow interpretation of
Meachum, many of the problems discussed above may be eliminated.
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teenth amendment, the Court focused on whether the "liberty
interest" was defined or protected by state law or the Constitution.
This decision may indicate a return to a traditional "hands-off"
approach regarding conflicts between prisoners and prison authori-
ties. It is an unfortunate retreat from the federal courts' position
of insuring that incarceration does not draw an iron curtain be-
tween the individual and the Constitution.
Tim Sindelar '77
